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Abstract
We study the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Fast traders’
ability to revise their quotes quickly after news arrivals helps to reduce the ineﬃciency that
is rooted in the risk of being “picked oﬀ”, which increases trade. However, their presence
induces slow traders to strategically submit limit orders with a lower execution probability,
thereby reducing trade. Because speed is a source of market power, it enables fast traders to
extract rents from others and triggers a costly arms race that reduces social welfare. The model
generates a number of testable implications concerning the eﬀects of high-frequency trading in
limit order markets.
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1 Introduction
High-frequency trading (HFT), a variant of algorithmic trading, relies on sophisticated computer
programs for the implementation of trading strategies that involve a vast amount of orders in very
small time intervals. The fact that market participants are spending considerable resources in an
eﬀort to gain speed advantages of a few milliseconds suggests that there are large payoﬀs to being
faster than others.1 Accordingly, HFT has grown tremendously over the past decade and by now is
estimated to account for 70% of trading in U.S. equities as well as 40% of spot FX volume.2 This
development has ignited a heated debate among financial economists, practitioners, and regulators
about the benefits and concerns related to HFT. While its advocates argue that technology increases
market eﬃciency through improved liquidity and price discovery3, others claim that faster market
participants use their speed advantage to extract rents and are a threat to market stability and
integrity.4
This paper contributes to this debate by presenting a stylized model of trading in a limit order
market where agents diﬀer in their trading speed, which is thought to capture the diﬀerence between
(fast) HFTs and (slow) human market participants. We build on the model of Foucault (1999), in
which limit orders cannot be revised after submission and may therefore become stale upon the
arrival of new value-relevant information. The resulting risk of being "picked oﬀ" gives rise to an
ineﬃciency, because a high level of asset price volatility leads agents to choose limit orders with a low
execution probability and thus reduces the likelihood that gains from trade are ultimately realized.
We extend Foucault’s model by endowing a proportion  of the trading crowd with a relative speed
advantage that improves their ability to manage outstanding limit orders compared to the remaining
market participants. More specifically, we assume that fast traders (FTs) are able to revise their
limit orders after news arrivals, but only in case the next agent is a slow trader (ST).
We analyze the stationary equilibrium of this dynamic limit order market and compare it to
the baseline case of identical traders studied by Foucault (1999). Overall, the presence of FTs has
two opposing eﬀects on the probability that gains from trade are shared. On the one hand, their
ability to revise some of their quotes after news arrivals reduces the existing ineﬃciency due to the
risk of being picked oﬀ and therefore increases trade. On the other hand, FTs’ speed advantage
introduces a new ineﬃciency because it can induce STs to strategically submit limit orders with a
lower execution probability, which reduces trade.
In order to understand this second eﬀect, it is useful to interpret the limit order market as
a sequential bargaining process, where traders may either accept outstanding oﬀers (via a market
1 see "Time is money when it comes to microwaves", Financial Times, May 10, 2013.
2 See "EBS take new step to rein in high-frequency traders", Reuters Newswire, August 23, 2013.
3 See e.g. Optiver, “High Frequency Trading”, Position Paper, 2011, http://fragmentation.fidessa.com/wp-
content/uploads/High-Frequency-Trading-Optiver-Position-Paper.pdf
4 See SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s speech "Remarks Before the Security Traders Association",
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch092210mls.htm.
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order) or alternatively make an oﬀer to the next agent (via a limit order). As usual in these situations,
agents’ bargaining power is determined by their outside option which here is given endogenously by
the expected payoﬀ earned from submitting a limit order. Now because they face a lower risk of
being picked oﬀ, the alternative of posting quotes becomes relatively more attractive to FTs. This
implies that they need to be oﬀered a higher share of the surplus in order to be convinced to accept
an existing oﬀer by using a market order. This situation creates a dilemma for STs: They can either
keep their chances of execution constant by increasing the aggressiveness of their limit orders in
order to attract both STs and FTs, or alternatively accept a decrease in execution probability by
only targeting STs. While the value of their outside option decreases in either case, the latter choice
(which is optimal if  is small) is socially ineﬃcient as gains from trade are realized less often.
Aside from aﬀecting trading volume and STs’ limit order execution probabilities, the shift in
market power between STs and FTs yields a number of additional testable implications concerning
the eﬀects of HFT in limit order markets. For example, one can show that FTs are more likely to
act as makers than as takers in equilibrium, and that their market orders execute at more favourable
prices that those of STs. While FTs’ limit orders face a reduced risk of being picked oﬀ, the risk of
adverse selection simultaneously increases for STs. In addition, the presence of FTs pushes quotes
closer to the asset’s fundamental value if volatility is suﬃciently high (the opposite holds for low
volatility). These predictions are consistent with the growing body of empirical research on HFT.
Even though the presence of FTs may ultimately allow more gains from trade to be reaped, this
increase in eﬃciency does not benefit STs because their reduced bargaining power ensures that they
are left with a smaller share of the total surplus and consequently always worse oﬀ in equilibrium.
This has important consequences for social welfare once one discards the assumption that speed is
given exogenously but rather considers the possibility that agents may become fast upon investing
into trading technology at a fixed cost. Because STs and FTs must earn the same net profits in
equilibrium, the equilibrium level of investment always leads to a social welfare loss compared to
the benchmark situation with only STs. Consequenty, policy interventions that aim at reducing the
rents associated with being fast can possibly improve upon the market outcome by preventing a
costly arms race. Based on this intuition, we suggest that regulators consider mandating pro-rata
matching for the most liquid stocks as well as randomized "speed bumps" that have been recently
adopted in several FX markets.
The literature on algorithmic trading and HFT has grown substantially in recent years [see
e.g. the surveys by Biais and Woolley (2012) and Foucault (2012)]. Most closely related to our
work is the paper by Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013) which studies the impact of HFT in a
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) framework. In their model, FTs have a higher chance of finding trading
opportunities than slow market participants and therefore help to increase the likelihood that gains
from trade are realized. But at the same time, they are a source of adverse selection due to private
information, which raises the bid-ask spread payable by everyone and therefore reduces trade. Just
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like here, FTs exert a negative externality and investment into HFT can be excessive in equilibrium.
However, the underlying mechanism is diﬀerent. In our model, FTs are actually able to avoid being
adversely selected. However, because agents trade directly with each other in a dynamic setting,
this eﬀectively increases their market power and allows them to extract rents from slower market
participants.
Also closely related, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2012) study competitive middlemen who interme-
diate between early limit order traders and late market order traders. Similar to our model, HFTs
may reduce adverse selection by updating quotes quickly and therefore increase trade. Yet, HFTs’
ability to process (hard) information quickly can also introduce a new adverse selection problem
that lowers trade. Based on the entry of a new trading venues for Dutch stocks, they conduct a
calibration exercise which reveals a slight increase in welfare.
A number of other papers also study HFT from a theoretical perspective. Cartea and Penalva
(2013) propose a model where their increased speed allows HFTs to impose a haircut on liquidity
traders, which raises trading volume and price volatility, but reduces the welfare of liquidity traders.
Foucault, Hombert and Rosu (2013) study the trading strategy of an informed trader who is able
to react faster than others to news. They conclude that this speed advantage makes the informed
trader’s order flow more volatile and increases his relative share in trading volume. Rosu and Mar-
tinez (2013) study HFTs as strategic informed traders who instantaneously react to new information
and ensure that it is reflected in prices immediately. Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) provide a model
where competing exchanges invest into speed and compete for investors. They provide conditions
under which competition, fragmentation and speed can improve or reduce welfare. Finally, Bernales
(2013) studies a setup similar to the one considered here, but the additional degree of complexity
forces him to resort to numerical techniques.
Empirical research on HFT and/or algorithmic trading can be roughly split into two categories.
The first strand of the literature, which includes Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011), Boehmer,
Fong and Wu (2012) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), uses empirical proxies based on anonymized
data to examine the impact of computerized trading activity on market quality. In short, these
papers conclude that computer-based trading causally improves market liquidity (e.g. lowers bid-ask
spreads), while the results concerning the impact on price volatility are rather mixed. The second,
growing strand of the literature uses proprietary datasets that enable the direct identification of
trading by HFTs, either as a group of even down to the level of individual market participants. This
approach has the benefit that it oﬀers deeper insights by allowing researchers to study the behaviour
of diﬀerent traders types and the associated eﬀects on market outcomes. The results emerging
from these research eﬀorts suggest that being fast is very profitable [e.g. Menkveld (2012), Baron,
Brogaard and Kirilenko (2012)], facilitates price discovery [e.g. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson
and Vega (2013), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013)], is frequently, but not exclusively
used to trade passively [e.g. Menkveld (2012), Hagströmer and Norden (2013), Malinova, Park and
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Riordan (2013)], and helps to reduce trading costs relative to slower market participants [Hendershott
and Riordan (2013), Malinova, Park and Riordan (2013), Carrion (2013)]. Moreover, consistent with
the present model and other theoretical work, recent evidence by Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden
and Riordan (2013) suggests that FTs face a reduced risk of being picked oﬀ but at the same time
expose others to adverse selection.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the model, whose equilibrium is
presented subsequently in Section 3. Section 4 develops a number of empirical predictions concerning
the impact of HFT in limit order markets, while social welfare and policy implications are discussed
in Section 5, followed by the Conclusion. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix A, while Appendix
B contains some figures that help to illustrate the model.
2 The model
2.1 The limit order market
We consider an infinite-horizon5 version of Foucault’s (1999) dynamic limit order market. There is
a single risky asset whose fundamental value follows a random walk, i.e.
 = −1 + 
where the innovations are i.i.d. and can take values of + and − with equal probability. Traders
arrive sequentially at time points  = 1 2    and are risk-neutral. Trading arises due to diﬀerences
in traders’ private values for the asset. Specifically, we assume that at time 0, a trader arriving at
time  ≤ 0 values the asset at
0 = 0 + 
which is the sum of the asset’s current fundamental value and the time-invariant private valuation
 ∈ {+−}, where both realizations occur with equal probability and   0. Moreover, the
private valuations are i.i.d. across traders and independent of the asset value innovations. We call
agents with a high (low) private valuation buyers (sellers).
Upon their arrival, traders choose between submitting a limit order or a market order for one
unit of the asset. Sell (buy) market orders execute at the currently best bid (ask), which we denote
by  ( ). Limit orders are stored in the order book for one period, after which they are assumed
to expire for tractability. This implies that at each point in time, the limit order book either a)
contains a bid quote b) an ask quote or c) is empty.6
5Foucault (1999) assumes that the terminal date is stochastic, as the trading process stops after each period with
constant probability 1−   0. An infinite horizon may be interpreted as the limiting case where → 1.
6We write  = −∞ ( =∞) if there is no bid (ask) quote available.
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One crucial assumption in the Foucault (1999) model is that traders cannot revise their limit
orders once they are submitted, which exposes their quotes to the risk of being picked oﬀ after news
arrivals as in Copeland and Galai (1983). Here, we depart from the original setting by assuming
that there are two types of agents, fast traders (FTs) and slow traders (STs), where  denotes the
probability that an agent is fast (assumed i.i.d. across traders and independent from  and ).
Speed is valuable because it enables agents to adjust their quotes quickly when news hit the market.
Accordingly, we assume that FTs are able to cancel their limit order and resubmit a new one after
the realization of +1, yet before the arrival of the next trader provided that he is slow. If, in
contrast, the next agents turns out to be fast as well, the quote cannot be revised.7 STs can never
cancel their outstanding orders. Figure 1 in Appendix B illustrates the timing of events in between
trader arrivals. Notice that being fast is a purely relative advantage and therefore only valuable if at
least some market participants are slow. Accordingly, the model collapses to the Foucault model for
both  = 0 and  = 1. While we take  as exogenous for most of our analysis, Section 5 endogenizes
investment into trading speed, similar in spirit to Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013).
2.2 Payoﬀs and strategies
Consider a given period and assume that a seller8 enters the market. As in Foucault (1999), the
focus is on Markov-perfect equilibria so that we may drop the time subscripts in order to avoid
notational clutter. Let  +  be the current value of the asset, where  ∈ {+−} is the most
recent innovation and  denotes the asset value in the previous period. Now assume that the seller’s
expected profit when choosing to post a limit order is equal to   , where  ∈ {} refers to
his type. Clearly, he will opt for a market sell order if the currently best available bid price  is
such that9
 − ( + − ) ≥    ∈ { } (1)
Here, the expected profit obtained from posting a limit order constitutes an agent’s endogenous
outside option when deciding upon whether or not to submit a market order. This implies that
the seller’s order choice is entirely determined by whether or not the best available bid is above his
sell cutoﬀ price, ˆ+ , which is the bid price that makes him indiﬀerent between submitting a limit
7 Importantly, this assumption does not require that a FT knows the next agent’s type. Rather, news arrivals
trigger a race between limit and market order traders to react first, and the assumption here is that the market order
trader wins the race unless the limit order trader is faster. This is also consistent with the Foucault (1999) model,
where all agents are equally fast.
8Due to symmetry, it suﬃces to consider one side of the market for each decision. We detail the order choice
(market vs. limit order) for a seller and the quotation problem for a buyer.
9We assume that agents submit a market order in case they are indiﬀerent. This choice is arbitrary and does not
aﬀect our conclusions.
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order or a market order given the current asset value  + 
ˆ+ =   + ( + − )  ∈ { } (2)
Now consider the quote-setting problem of a buyer that arrives one period earlier. When choosing
his bid price, he faces the trade-oﬀ that a more aggressive limit order implies a higher probability
of execution but at the same time yields a lower profit conditional on execution. Importantly, the
execution of a limit order does not only depend on the type of trader that follows in the next period
but also on the forthcoming realization of . Now let () denote the execution probability of a
ST’s buy limit order with bid price . Given the discreteness of innovations () and trader types
(), this probability is an increasing step function, and the "jumps" occur at the points where 
crosses one of the possible sell cutoﬀ prices that the agent arriving in the next period may possibly
have. Clearly, optimality implies that the set of bid quotes agents eﬀectively choose from is equal to
the set of sellers’ sell cutoﬀ prices.10 The objective function of a slow buyer that decides to submit
a limit order can be written as
  = max {( )( +[] + − )} (3)
where [·] denotes expectation conditional on execution. The decision problem of a fast buyer
opting for limit orders is slightly more complex because he may revise his quote upon the realization
of  conditional on the next trader being a ST. Hence he eﬀectively chooses a tuple of three bid
prices (  +  − ). Now let | () denote the execution probability of a FT’s limit order
with bid price  conditional on the next period’s trader type and asset value innovation.11 Then,
the fast buyer’s objective function is
  = max + −
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
| ( )( +[] + − )
+ (1−)2 |+ (+ )( +  + −+ )
+ (1−)2 |− (− )( −  + −− )
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(4)
It is easy to see that our assumption on FTs’ ability to revise their limit orders implies that
+ and − are set in perfect knowledge about both the next trader’s type and the forthcoming
realization of . Hence they must be optimally chosen to be equal to a ST’s cutoﬀ price in the next
period, i.e. + = ˆ+ and − = ˆ− , so that the maximization problem simplifies to
max
©| ( )( +[] + − )ª (5)
10A bid price strictly above a cutoﬀ price is suboptimal (it has the same execution probability as a slightly lower
price). As there are no gains from trade between two buyers, bid quotes will only aim at sellers in equilibrium.
11The conditional execution probabilities for STs’ limit orders are accordingly denoted by | ().
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Clearly, FTs’ ability to revise some of their limit orders ensures that the endogenous outside
option of posting limit orders is more valuable to them than to STs in equilibrium. Because the
relative advantage of being fast is directly tied to the risk of being picked oﬀ12 , the following ordering
of sell cutoﬀ prices must always obtain in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, ˆ−∗ ≤ ˆ−∗ ≤ ˆ+∗ ≤ ˆ+∗
The equilibrium is computed by simultaneously solving equations (2), (3) and (5) and verifying
the absence of profitable deviations.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Optimal quotes
Similar to Colliard and Foucault (2012), we categorize agents’ strategies according to their respec-
tive (conditional) limit order execution probabilities. The following definition will be helpful in
characterizing the equilibrium.
Definition 1 A ST (FT) uses a high fill-rate strategy if his (initial) limit order is such that ∗|  0
(∗|  0) for all . All other quotes constitute a low fill-rate strategy. Moreover, a ST uses a
specialized strategy if ∗|  ∗| for some . Otherwise, the strategy is unspecialized.
Intuitively, a high fill-rate strategy corresponds to posting a limit order that has a strictly positive
execution probability for every possible future realization of  and is therefore exposed to the risk of
being picked oﬀ. In contrast, low fill-rate strategies do not face this risk and consequently oﬀer lower
chances of execution. Importantly, both types of traders face this choice because FTs’ initial quotes
can still be picked oﬀ by other FTs. Furthermore, a specialized strategy refers to submitting a limit
order that, for some values of , only attracts execution by STs, but not by FTs. If, for a given ,
the order attracts either both types of traders or no trader at all, it is called unspecialized. Notice
that this distinction is only relevant for STs because FTs de-facto only make a choice regarding
the initial quote and this one is fully characterized by its fill-rate. Equipped with this typology of
strategies, we can now state the following.
Proposition 1 For fixed parameters (  ), there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in
the limit order market. In equilibrium
a) STs use a high fill-rate strategy for   ∗ () and a low fill-rate strategy otherwise.
12 In the limit when  → 0, being fast is not beneficial anymore because limit orders are no further exposed to the
risk of being picked oﬀ.
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b) STs use a specialized strategy for   ∗() and an unspecialized strategy otherwise.
c) FTs use a high fill-rate strategy for   ∗ () ≤ ∗ () and a low fill-rate strategy otherwise.
The definitions of ∗ (), ∗ () and ∗() are provided in the Appendix.
The trade-oﬀ between execution probability and expected profit conditional on execution helps to
understand the intuition that underlies Proposition 1. In line with Foucault (1999), parts a) and c)
state that a high (low) level of volatility induces agents to post limit orders with low (high) chances
of execution. Intuitively, larger innovations imply a more severe adverse selection risk for limit order
traders, and the natural reaction is then to protect oneself from unfavourable price movements by
posting less aggressive limit orders. Part b) is similarly intuitive and rests on the fact that, in
equilibrium, the outside option of posting limit orders is more valuable for FTs than for STs. If 
is relatively low, it is not very attractive for STs to target FTs with their limit orders because this
leads only to a small increase in execution probability but at the same time requires considerably
more aggressive quotes. Hence they only use an unspecialized strategy when  is suﬃciently large.
Figure 2 in Appendix B depicts the functions ∗ (), ∗ () and ∗() in the ( )-space, where
we have set  = 1 (this is without loss of generality as only the ratio of  and  is relevant).
The assumption that  is both discrete and bounded allows us to obtain a closed-form solution.
However, it restricts traders to choose among extremes (high and low fill-rate strategies), and small
parameter changes may lead to large changes in outcomes that are not robust to alternative distribu-
tional assumptions. In order to mitigate such distortions, we define  ≡ 813 and  ≡ 4(7−√5)
and henceforth apply the following parameter restriction.13
Assumption 1 (technical)  ∈ Σ ≡ Σ ∪ Σ where Σ = [0 ) and Σ = [∞).
The excluded interval [ ) is depicted in Figure 2. Eﬀectively, this assumption rules out an
equilibrium where STs use a high fill-rate strategy and FTs use a low fill-rate strategy, such that we
are left with 4 distinct types of equilibria. This also helps to simplify the exposition considerably,
because it implies that all traders use the same strategy in terms of fill-rate for all possible values
of .
In the following, we refer to the diﬀerent types of equilibria by the strategy chosen by STs for
parsimony. We abbreviate the unspecialized low (high) fill-rate equilibrium as ULFR (UHFR) and
the specialized low (high) fill-rate equilibrium as SLFR (SHFR). Outcomes for  = 0 (i.e. the
Foucault (1999) model) are denoted by the subscript 0, e.g.  ∗0 refers to the equilibrium expected
profits from limit orders in a market with only STs.
13We numerically verify that all results presented in this paper are also obtained under normally distributed inno-
vations.
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3.2 Market events and bargaining power
In order to compute (expected) equilibrium outcomes we will frequently require knowledge about
the likelihood of a particular event to occur on the equilibrium path. To this end, we define the
following four mutually exclusive events. The arriving agent can be 1) a ST submitting a limit order,
2) a ST submitting a market order, 3) a FT submitting a limit order, or 4) a FT submitting a market
order. Now let ∗ = (∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ ) denote the stationary probability distribution of
these events in equilibrium, where we naturally have ∗ +∗ = 1− and ∗ +∗ = .
Then one can show the following.
Proposition 2 For fixed parameters (  ), the stationary probability distribution of equilibrium
events is given by
∗ = 1−  [1− (
1
2
− ∗| )]
∗ = 1−  [− 1 + (
1
2
− ∗| )]
∗ =  [1 + (1− )(
∗
| − ∗| )]
∗ =  [− 1− (1− )(
∗
| − ∗| )]
where  = (1 + ∗| )(1 + (1− )∗| )− (1−)2 ∗|
In the following, it will often be helpful for understanding the model’s intuition to interpret the
limit order market as a sequential bargaining game over a surplus of 2. Agents post take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers (limit orders), which the following trader may either accept (via a market order) or
reject and instead make another oﬀer (via a limit order) to the agent arriving one period after him.
As usual in these situations, agents’ bargaining power is determined by the value of their outside
option, which here is equal to the expected profit from posting a limit order. As already mentioned,
the alternative of posting a limit order is more valuable to FTs than to STs because timely quote
revisions reduce the risk of being picked oﬀ. However, it turns out that this directly implies that
STs bargaining power deteriorates compared to the situation without FTs.
Corollary 1  ∗   ∗0   ∗ for all  ∈ (0 1).
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4 Empirical Implications
Based on agents’ equilbrium quotation strategies and the resulting stationary distribution of market
events, one may derive a number of implications concerning the possible eﬀects of HFT in limit
order markets. Whenever possible, we relate these predictions to existing theoretical and empirical
research.
4.1 Trading volume and limit order execution probabilities
We start by examining the trading rate (or per-period expected trading volume) which is defined as
the unconditional probability of observing a trade in a given period, that is
∗ ≡ ∗ + ∗ (6)
It is important to stress that the trading rate is a measure of eﬃciency (and thus welfare) in this
model as it eﬀectively states how frequently gains from trade are realized. We discuss issues related
to social welfare in Section 5. Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we deduce the following.
Corollary 2 The presence of FTs (weakly) increases the trading rate except if both  and  are
low, that is ∗  ∗0 for  ∈ Σ and 0    ∗() and ∗ ≥ ∗0 otherwise.
Compared to a market with only STs, the presence of FTs aﬀects the trading rate in two ways.
First, they help to reduce the ineﬃciency that usually arises when  is large and some of the potential
gains from trade between buyers and sellers are not realized because the risk of being picked oﬀ
induces agents to post limit orders with low execution probabilities. In these situations, their ability
to revise quotes quickly when trading with STs protects them against adverse price movements and
accordingly reduces the need for quoting cautiously, thereby increasing trade. Second, the presence
of FTs introduces an additional ineﬃciency because their larger outside option eﬀectively creates
a dilemma for STs when deciding about their quotation strategy. They may either ) increase the
aggressiveness of their quotes in order to aim at execution from both FTs and STs (thus maintaining
a constant probability of execution compared to the case where  = 0) or ) accept a lower execution
probability by using a specialized strategy. While we know from Corollary 1 that their expected
profits from limit orders decline in either case, the second choice [which is optimal for   ∗()] is
ineﬃcient from a social point of view because it reduces the likelihood that the total surplus of 2
is shared. For  ∈ Σ, this eﬀect yields a net decrease in the trading rate because the eﬃciency gain
of fast cancellations (which dominates otherwise) only arises for a suﬃciently high level of volatility.
In addition, it gives rise to the following empirical prediction.
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Corollary 3 The presence of FTs induces STs to submit limit orders with lower execution proba-
bilities, that is we have ∗ ≤ ∗0 for all  ∈ (0 1).
Notice that FTs may submit more than one limit order per arrival due to their ability to revise
quotes, such that it need not be the case that their orders have a higher execution probability than
∗0. However, they obviously have a higher chance of generating a trade conditional on deciding to
post market orders.
While Corollary 3 is, to our knowledge, novel to the literature, several other theoretical papers
make predictions about the impact of HFT on trading volume. In Biais, Foucault, and Moinas
(2013), FTs are more likely to locate trading opportunities (which increases trading volume) but
at the same time possess private information and therefore create adverse selection (which reduces
trade). In Jovanovich and Menkveld (2012), the introduction of competitive HFT middlemen raises
trading activity by reducing an existing winner’s curse problem (similar in spirit to this paper),
but at the same time may also lower volume by creating a new adverse selection problem via their
superior ability of processing hard information quickly (e.g. real-time datafeeds on index futures). In
Cartea and Penalva (2011), HFTs intermediate between end-investors and therefore increase trading
volume mechanically. While the accelerated increase in trading activity over the past decades [see
e.g. Chordia et a. (2011)] has been accompanied by the advent of HFT, direct empirical evidence
on the impact of HFT on trading volume is rather scarce. Jovanovich and Menkveld (2012) report
an increase in trade frequency for Dutch equities vis-à-vis a Belgian control group following the
introduction of a HFT-friendly trading venue. Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden and Riordan (2013)
report a small, but statistically insignificant increase in volume for Swedish stocks following the
introduction of a new co-location service on Nasdaq OMX in Sweden. Clearly, further work based
on natural experiments is desirable to shed light on this issue. However, Corollary 2 suggests that
future studies should control for the level of volatility because the impact of FTs on trading volume
varies with the severity of the adverse selection risk faced by limit orders.
4.2 The risk of being picked oﬀ
In this model, agents face the risk of being picked oﬀ when they are not suﬃciently fast to react to new
information by adjusting their quotes. As a consequence, market order traders will sometimes obtain
additional windfall profits on top of their outside option value because favourable price movements
(from their perspective) render outstanding limit orders stale. These situations arise in the high
fill-rate equilibria, where agents post bid quotes that attract execution after both price increases
and decreases. While such limit orders guarantee a higher chance of execution, a price decrease
induces regret in the sense that the trader would prefer lowering his bid after observing the latest
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news. Accordingly, the risk of being picked oﬀ due to price changes for a buy limit order submitted
by a type− trader is given by
∗ =
( 1
2∗|−
∗
0
for  ∈ Σ
for  ∈ Σ (7)
∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩

2 ∗|−
∗| +(1−) 12
0
for  ∈ Σ
for  ∈ Σ (8)
As already implied previously, FTs’ face a reduced adverse selection risk due to their ability to
revise outstanding orders when being followed by a STs. However, their presence simultaneously
increases the risk of being picked oﬀ for STs despite the fact that those are not even able to adjust
their quotes in a market without FTs. The reason for this is once again the diﬀerence in traders’
bargaining power and can be understood by considering the SHFR equilibrium where ∗ = ˆ+∗ .
Due to their higher outside option, FTs are only willing to submit sell market orders after asset
value decreases, that is they only accept the most profitable trading opportunities. Accordingly,
the relative odds that slow limit order traders have their quotes hit under unfavourable conditions
increase.
Corollary 4 Compared to the case where  = 0, STs (FTs) face a higher (lower) risk of being
picked oﬀ, i.e. ∗ ≥ ∗0 ≥ ∗ for all  ∈ (0 1).
Unlike in Bais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013), diﬀerences in speed give rise to an asymmetry in
the distribution of adverse selection risks across traders. While FTs are picked oﬀ less frequently,
similar to Jovanovich and Menkveld (2012), this directly translates into a more severe winners’
curse problem for STs. Empirically, the ∗ can be proxied by the price impacts faced by diﬀerent
trader types’ limit orders. Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden and Riordan (2013) study trading on
Nasdaq OMX in Sweden and are able to identify a shock to the speed hierarchy by exploiting
the introduction of an enhanced co-location service. Consistent with the above prediction, market
participants subscribing to the update are able to reduce the risk of being picked oﬀ. In addition,
some of their results also indicate that FTs impose adverse selection on slow market participants,
which is also consistent with the higher permanent price impacts of FTs’ market orders documented
by Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013) and Hendershott and Riordan (2011) for Nasdaq and
the German stock exchange, respectively. Furthermore, Carrion (2013) provides additional evidence
that FTs’ limit (market) orders are associated with lower (higher) permanent price impacts than
those of other traders.
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4.3 The cost of immediacy for market orders
Following Foucault (1999), we may define the expected trading cost, (∗), as the signed diﬀerence
between the transaction price and the asset’s fundamental value. Now because traders diﬀer in their
outside options and moreover face diﬀerent quotes when arriving to the market (some of the quotes
faced by STs have been revised), the trading costs for a particular transaction do not only depend
on  but also on the previous agent’s type. Let  denote the trading cost incurred by a type-
trader whose market order executes against the limit order of a type- trader conditional on the
latest realization of , where   ∈ { }, and let ∗ be the associated probability of this event
in equilibrium. Then,
(∗) =
X

∗X

∗
 ∗ (9)
Now because agents’ profits from market orders (and hence their expected trading costs) are directly
tied to their bargaining power [see equation (1)], it is immediate that FTs trade at more favourable
prices than STs.
Corollary 5 STs incur higher trading costs than FTs, that is (∗ )  (∗ ) for all  ∈ (0 1).
Notice that STs do not only pay higher trading costs than FTs as a consequence of their rel-
atively worse outside option. In addition, they also face a decreased likelihood of being able to
pick oﬀ stale quotes and reap the associated windfall profits in excess of  ∗ . Given that FTs
are suﬃciently quick in adjusting their quotes, STs will only encounter these particularly profitable
trading opportunities when hitting the quotes of other STs.14
Several empirical papers provide evidence that is consistent with Corollary 5. Hasbrouck and
Saar (2009) document a considerable increase in the proportion of "fleeting" limit orders from 1990
to 2005, which is suggestive of an increasingly large fraction of quotes not being acessible by slow
market participants. Garvey and Wu (2010) show that geographical distance to the market center
is negatively related to execution speed and positively related to transactions costs. More direct
evidence is presented by Hendershott and Riordan (2013), who study transactions data on the
German stock exchange and find that "algorithmic traders consume liquidity when it is cheap" in
the sense that they pay lower eﬀective spreads than slower human traders. Similarly, Malinova,
Park and Riordan (2013), Carrion (2013), and Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden and Riordan (2013)
show that FTs pay lower eﬀective spreads than STs for Candian, U.S., and Swedish stock exchange,
respectively.
14Notice that Corollary 5 does not imply that (∗ )  (∗0) because, for intermediate values of , the increased
aggressiveness of STs’ quotes in the unspecialized equilibria can push STs’ trading costs below those prevailing in
the absence of FTs. However, this eﬀect merely constitutes a re-distribution of gains from trade among STs and is
consequently neutral for the breakdown of total trading profits across trader types.
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4.4 Make-take decisions
In most other theoretical models that study high-frequency trading, FTs are assumed to be special-
ized on one side of the market, i.e. they always trade via limit orders or always use market orders.
Departing from this assumption allows us to analyze how diﬀerences in speed aﬀect the agents’
probability of being makers or takers. To this end, we define the maker-taker ratio for a given trader
type as the probability of trading via a limit order divided by the probability of trading via a market
order. Using the notation introduced in the previous subsection, we have
 ∗ =
∗ + ∗
∗ + ∗ (10)
Now it is easy to see that FTs will only display a make-take ratio of more than 1 if and only
if they are more likely to supply liquidity to STs than to consume liquidity from them. It turns
out that this is always the case, which is the combined result of two eﬀects. First, FTs enjoy the
maximal execution probability of 12 conditional on the arrival of a ST because their ability to revise
quotes in the light of new information has eliminated the risk of being picked oﬀ. Second, FTs are
relatively less likely than STs to submit market orders when arriving to the market because they
reject some of the quotes that STs would find worth accepting (due to their higher outside option).
This is easily verified by looking at the stationary probability distribution in Proposition 2.
In addition, it is also interesting to explore how volatility aﬀects the make-take breakdown for
each trader type. To this end, we may hold () fixed and compare outcomes across equilibria for
diﬀerent parameter values for . Intuitively, a higher level of volatility induces traders to submit less
aggressive limit orders because of adverse selection. However, FTs will be able to continue providing
liquidity to STs without incurring any additional risk because the latter are only able to hit the
revised quotes. Consequently, a higher level of  increases the relative odds of FTs being makers.
Corollary 6 FTs are always more likely to trade via a limit order than STs, that is we have ∗ ≥
1 ≥  ∗ for all  ∈ (0 1). Moreover,  ( ) is decreasing (increasing) in  for all
 ∈ (0 1).
The prediction that FTs are more likely to act as makers than as takers is consistent with the
extensive market-making activities of large HFT firms (e.g. Getco, Knight, Citadel, Optiver, etc.).
In addition, several empirical papers provide evidence that is consistent with this view. Menkveld
(2013) studies a large HFT that participated in almost 15% of all transactions in Dutch stocks traded
on Euronext and Chi-X and used limit orders roughly 80% of the time. Hagströmer and Norden
(2013) and Malinova, Park and Riordan (2013) provide evidence that is consistent with HFT mainly
acting as makers in Swedish and Canadian equities, respectively. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson
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and Vega (2013) study trading in three diﬀerent FX pairs and find that in the two most liquid pairs
(EUR/USD and JPY/USD) humans are more likely to consume liquidity from computers than vice
versa. However, this result does not obtain for the third pair (JPY/EUR), which is likely due to the
possibility that most of these trades stem from agents exploiting triangular arbitrage opportunities
by market orders. The reason for the finding in Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013) that
FTs are roughly equally likely to provide or consume liquidity may be similarly founded in arbitrage
activities across trading venues in the heavily fragmentated U.S. equity market. To our knowledge,
the prediction concerning the impact of volatility on the make-take breakdown for STs and FTs has
not yet been tested formally in the literature.
4.5 The pricing error of quotes
Price eﬃciency is a frequently studied concept in market microstructure and it usually arises in
models of asymmetric information. Although there is no uncertainty (and thus no learning) about
the true asset value in the present model, quoted prices will still deviate from fundamentals for
two reasons. First, information arrivals render existing quotes stale unless they can be updated
suﬃciently fast. Second, limit order traders have market power and their attempt to extract rents
will push quotes away from fundamentals. We define the pricing error of posted quotes (a measure
of ineﬃciency) as the expectation of the absolute diﬀerence between the true asset value and the
best available quote, that is
∗ =  [| −|] (11)
It turns out that the presence of FTs may have both a positive and a negative eﬀect on the pricing
error. On the one hand, their ability to revise quotes quickly reduces the discrepancy between quotes
and fundamentals. On the other hand, speed is a source of market power and may therefore increase
the pricing error. Consequently, if fundamentals are suﬃciently volatile, pricing errors due to market
power are of second order and FTs help to make quotes more eﬃcient. If, however,  is small relative
to , the shift in bargaining power across trader types can result in larger absolute deviations.
Corollary 7 Compared to the case where  = 0, the presence of FTs decreases (increases) the
pricing error if volatility is high (low), that is ∗  ∗0 (∗  ∗0) for  ∈ Σ ( ∈ bΣ ⊂ Σ)
and  ∈ (0 1).
Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and Vega (2013) examine the rise of algorithmic trading in
the foreign exchange market and conclude that FTs increase price eﬃciency. In line with the first
part of the above Corollary, part of this improvement is due to the revision of outstanding quotes.
However, they also find that FTs correct short-term mispricing by using market orders, which is
16
more consistent with the models put forward by Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013) and Martinez
and Rosu (2013). Similarly, Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013) find that FTs contribute
positively to price eﬃciency both with limit and with market orders using data on HFT activity
from Nasdaq. To our knowledge there is to date no empirical research that is consistent with FTs
increasing pricing errors.
5 Welfare and Policy implications
5.1 Welfare
We now turn to a discussion of welfare. Each agent’s expected utility is given by his trading profits,
which may be expressed as a weighted average of the expected profits from posting limit and market
orders
 ∗ = 
∗
∗ + ∗
 ∗ + 
∗
∗ + ∗
(−(∗)) (12)
Total welfare can then be computed by weighting the profits for each type by its share in the
overall trader population. Because gains from trade are only realized upon the submission of a
market order, this is equal to 2 times the trading rate.
 ∗ =  ∗ + (1− ) ∗ = 2× ∗ (13)
It turns out that although the presence of FTs actually increases  ∗ relative to its level for  = 0
if  is suﬃciently large (see Corollary 2), the associated redistribution in bargaining power allows
them to capture all the extra surplus. As a consequence, STs are always worse oﬀ, not only in the
instances where diﬀerences in speed lead to less trading.
Corollary 8 We have  ∗   ∗0   ∗ for all  ∈ (0 1).
This result has profound implications for social welfare once we discard the assumption that 
is exogenous. To see this, assume now that all traders are born slow but may decide to becom fast
prior to the start of trading at a cost  as in Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013). Let ∗ denote the
proportion of traders who decide to become fast in equilibrium. Then, an interior solution15 implies
that both trader types earn the same net profits
 ∗ (∗)−  = ∗ (∗) (14)
15Existence may fail for some  because the diﬀerence ∗ (∗)−∗ (∗) is not continuous at the points where
we move from one equilibrium to another.
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and social welfare with endogenous investment in trading speed is given by
ˆ ∗(∗) = 2× ∗(∗)− ∗ (15)
Obviously, corner equilibria may arise in cases where  is either prohibitively high or alternatively
where the incremental benefit of becoming fast is always strictly positive. However, the fact that
speed is a purely relative advantage implies ˆ ∗(1) = ˆ ∗(0)− , so that we conclude the following.
Corollary 9 Equilibrium investment in relative trading speed always lowers social welfare relative
to the situation where  = 0, that is ˆ ∗(∗)  ˆ ∗(0) for all ∗  0.
Together with the equilibrium condition (14), the decrease in STs’ trading profits (Corollary 8)
implies that the equilibrium level of investment always leads to a welfare loss relative to a market
where all traders are slow. This eﬀect arises because speed helps agents to exert market power on
STs, which creates incentives for becoming fast even in situations where it is socially wasteful and
accordingly there is too much investment from a social welfare perspective. STs are hurt because
their lower bargaining power leads to a reduced profitability of limit orders and fewer attractive
trading opportunities as they are less likely to encounter stale quotes. Consequently, the negative
externality here is diﬀerent from the one in Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013). Also, unlike in their
model, full investment (∗ = 1) is always detrimental to welfare because the resulting outcomes are
identical to the ones arising when all traders are slow. In this context, it is important to highlight that
our model is entirely focused on the role of relative speed and does not consider other, potentially
beneficial eﬀects related to the use of computer technology (e.g. reduced search costs).
5.2 Policy implications
Because investment in trading speed generates a negative externality for slow market participants,
regulatory intervention can possibly improve on the market outcome that entails a social welfare
loss. However, it is important to note that some investment into speed can be beneficial as FTs allow
more gains from trade to be reaped for  ∈ Σ, such that the optimal level of  is strictly positive
in this case for  suﬃciently small. Thus, in an ideal world, the policies aiming at mitigating the
negative eﬀects of HFT should be designed carefully in order to allow society to enjoy some of the
possible benefits.
In the context of our model, a natural way of achieving such an outcome would be the introduction
of a fee on order cancellations. Eﬀectively, this measure would lower FTs’ profits and therefore reduce
the incentives to become fast in equilibrium. In line with this idea, France and Italy have recently
introduced surcharges for HFTs that submit more than five messages per trade and do not act as
market makers as part of their transactions taxes on equities. However, it is important to keep in
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mind that such a policy would not aﬀect market participants that use their speed advantage to pick
oﬀ others through market orders, a mechanism absent in our theory.
A realistic feature of our model is that diﬀerences in speed lead to a re-distribution in market
power across traders. In today’s markets, standard rules such as continuous trading and price-time
priority allow agents to extract considerable rents by being first in a queue of limit orders or seizing
fleeting trading opportunities ahead of slower competitors. Because of the "winner takes it all"
nature of many trading situations, agents are willing to spend large sums on only marginal speed
improvements. These developments call for policies that aim at reducing the market power associated
with being fast in order to lower the incentives for market participants to engage in a costly arms
race. Suitable measures could be the adoption of pro-rata matching for the most liquid assets and
the introduction of tiny "speed bumps" such as the ones that are have been recently introduced
in several FX trading platforms.16 While such rather small changes are unlikely to distort market
functioning, they would certainly help to eliminate trading strategies that solely rely on relative
speed (e.g. latency arbitrage).
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing controversy about the benefits and concerns related to HFT
by presenting a stylized model of a limit order market where investors diﬀer in their trading speed.
We show that FTs help to reap more gains from trade because their speed advantage reduces the risk
of being "picked oﬀ" and therefore eliminates the need for posting cautious limit orders. However,
a new ineﬃciency arises as STs strategically submit limit orders with a lower execution probability
as a response to FTs’ increased outside option. Because diﬀerences in speed lead to a redistribution
of market power across the trader population, STs are always worse oﬀ than in a market with
identical traders. This directly translates into a social welfare loss if the proportion of FTs is not
given exogenously but rather determined in equilibrium through costly investment. We discuss some
potential policy implications that may help to stop the ongoing arms race in the financial industry.
In addition, the model delivers a number of empirical predictions concerning the possible eﬀects
of HFT in limit order markets, which are either novel to the literature or consistent with existing
empirical work.
16 In April 2013, eleven major banks launched ParFX, a trading platform for currencies where each order is delayed
randomly by 20-80 milliseconds. Similarly, EBS started to batch incoming messages and randomizing their order of
arrival in August. See "EBS take new step to rein in high-frequency traders", Reuters Newswire, August 23rd, 2013.
19
References
[1] Baron, M., Brogaard, J. and Kirilenko, A. (2012) "The Trading Profits of High Frequency
Traders", Working Paper
[2] Bernales, A. (2013) "How fast can you trade? High-frequency trading in dynamic limit order
markets", mimeo
[3] Biais, B., Foucault, T., and Moinas, S. (2013), "Equilibrium fast trading", Working Paper
[4] Biais, B., and Woolley, P. (2011), "High-frequency trading", Working Paper
[5] Boehmer, E., Fong, K. Y. L., and Wu, J. (2012) "International Evidence on Algorithmic Trad-
ing", Working Paper
[6] Brogaard, J., Hagströmer, B., Norden, L., and Riordan, R. (2013) “Trading fast and slow:
Colocation and market quality”, Working Paper
[7] Brogaard, J., Hendershott, T., and Riordan, R. (2013) “High-frequency trading and price dis-
covery”, Working Paper
[8] Carrion, A. (2013) "Very fast money: High-frequency trading on the NASDAQ", Journal of
Financial Markets, forthcoming
[9] Cartea, A., and Penalva, J. (2013) “Where is the value in high-frequency trading”, Quarterly
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
[10] Chaboud, A., Chiquoine, B., Hjalmarsson, E., and Vega, C. (2013), “Rise of the machines:
Algorithmic trading in the foreign exchange market“, Working Paper
[11] Chordia, T., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A. (2011) "Recent Trends in trading activity and
market quality", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 101, No 2: 243-263
[12] Colliard, J.-E., and Foucault, T. (2012) “Trading fees and eﬃciency in limit order markets”,
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
[13] Copeland, T. E., and Galai, D. (1983), “Information eﬀects on the bid-ask spread”, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 38, No. 5: 1457-69
[14] Foucault, T. (1999) "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market",
Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 2, No. 2: 99-134.
[15] Foucault, T. (2012),"Algorithmic Trading: Issues and Preliminary Evidence", in "Market Mi-
crostructure: Confronting Many Viewpoints", John Wiley & Sons
20
[16] Foucault, T., Hombert, J., and Rosu, I. (2013) "News trading and speed", Working Paper
[17] Garvey, R. and Wu, F. (2010) "Speed, distance, and electronic trading: New evidence on why
location matters", Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 13, No 4: 367—396.
[18] Glosten, L. and Milgrom, P. (1985) "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with
heterogeneously informed traders", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1: 71—100
[19] Hagströmer, B. and Norden, L. (2013) “The diversity of high-frequency traders”, Journal of
Financial Markets, forthcoming
[20] Hasbrouck, J., and Saar, G. (2009) "Trading and technology: The blurring of traditional defi-
nitions", Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 12, No. 2: 143-172
[21] Hasbrouck, J., and Saar, G. (2013) "Low-latency trading", Journal of Financial Markets, forth-
coming
[22] Hendershott, T., Jones, C., and Menkveld, A. (2011) “Does algorithmic trading improve liq-
uidity?”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 66, No. 1: 1-33.
[23] Hendershott, T., and Riordan, R. (2013) “Algorithmic Trading and the Market for Liquidity ”,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
[24] Hendershott, T., and Riordan, R. (2011) “Algorithmic Trading and Information ”, Working
Paper
[25] Jovanovic, B., and Menkveld, A. (2012), “Middlemen in Securities Markets”, Working Paper
[26] Malinova, K, Park, A., and Riordan, R. (2013) "Do retail traders suﬀer from high-frequency
traders?", Working Paper
[27] Menkveld, A. (2012) “High-frequency trading and the new-market makers”, Journal of Financial
Markets, forthcoming
[28] Pagnotta, E., and Philippon, T. (2012) "Competing on Speed", Working Paper
[29] Rosu, I., and Martinez, V. (2013) "High-Frequency Traders, News and Volatility", Working
Paper
21
Appendix A - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Clearly, the ability to revise limit orders can never be a disadvantage such that we trivially have
 ∗ ≥  ∗ , and equation (2) then implies that ˆ+∗ ≥ ˆ+∗ for all .
It remains to show that ˆ+∗ ≥ ˆ−∗ . First, notice that  is the maximum expected gains
from trade that per period (if two agents with diﬀerent private valuations trade they share a surplus
of 2 , but this occurs at most with probability 12) we must have  ≥  ∗ ≥ 0 for  ∈ { }.
Now assume that  ≥ 2. Using equation (2), we have  +  ≥ ˆ+∗ ≥  +  −  and
− ≥ ˆ−∗ ≥ −−, which directly implies ˆ+∗ ≥ ˆ−∗ . Instead, suppose that   2
and consider a fast buyer submitting a buy limit order. It is easy to see that in this case we have

4 [− +− ˆ+∗ ] + 4 [+ +− ˆ+∗ ] ≥ 4 [− +− ˆ−∗ ] such that his optimal choice
is ∗ = ˆ+∗ . Notice that a buyer arriving at one period later will never execute this order
because  −  +   ˆ+∗ , that is the bid price ∗ is below his lowest possible valuation. Now
consider a slow buyer and suppose he posts a buy limit order with ∗ = ˆ+∗ . As this is not
necessarily his equilibrium strategy we have that  ∗ ≥ 12 [+− ˆ+∗ ]. But we just concluded
that  ∗ = 2 [ +− ˆ+∗ ] + 1−4 [ − +− ˆ−∗ ] + 1−4 [ +  +− ˆ+∗ ], and therefore
 ∗ −  ∗ ≤ 1−4 [ˆ+∗ − ˆ−∗ ] + 1−4 [ˆ+∗ − ˆ+∗ ] = 1−2 [ ∗ −  ∗ ] + 1−2 . Then,
using equation (2), we obtain  ∗ −  ∗ ≤ 1−1+, which lets us conclude that ˆ+∗  ˆ−∗ .
Proof of Proposition 1
Finding an equilibrium involves 2 steps:
1) Conjecture equilibrium strategies and solve for the resulting outside option values / equilibrium
cutoﬀ prices.
2) Find parameter restrictions for which the assumed strategies are best replies (i.e. deviations are
not profitable)
Type 1 equilibrium:
Step 1: Assume ∗ = ˆ−∗ and ∗ = ˆ−∗ which implies that ∗ = 1−4 and ∗| = 14 . Using
the the optimally revised FT quotes with conditional execution probabilities |+ = |− = 12 ,
the equilibrium expected profits from posting limit orders are given by
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 ∗ = 1− 4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
(16)
 ∗ = 4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
(17)
+
1− 
4
h
 +  + − ˆ+∗
i
+
1− 
4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
Using the fact that the cutoﬀ prices are linear in the asset value, we can use equation (2) to
obtain a system of 2 equations in the 2 unknowns which can be solved for  ∗ = (2) 1−5− and
 ∗ = (2) 8−(3+)(5−)(4+) .
Step 2: Given that optimality implies that any equilibrium quote must be chosen from the set
of sellers’ sell cutoﬀ prices, there are no profitable deviations for slow buyers iﬀ
1− 
4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
≥ 1
4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
(18)
1− 
4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
≥ 1
4
h
 −  + − ˆ+∗
i
(19)
+
1− 
4
h
 +  + − ˆ+∗
i
1− 
4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
≥ 1
4
h
 −  + − ˆ+∗
i
(20)
+
1
4
h
 +  + − ˆ+∗
i
Similarly, fast buyers have no incentives to deviate iﬀ:

4
h
 −  + − ˆ−∗
i
≥ 
4
h
 −  + − ˆ+∗
i
(21)
+

4
h
 +  + − ˆ+∗
i
Using again equation (2), it can be easily verified that this is the case for  ≤ √5 − 2 and
 ≥  45− , such that the above quotation strategies constitute an equilibrium for this range of
parameters. The proof for the remaining equilibrium types follows exactly the same logic, such that
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we omit them for brevity. Now define the functions ∗ (), ∗ () and ∗() as
∗ () ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∗1()
∗4()
∗5()
if  ≤ ∗1
if ∗1   ≤ ∗2
if ∗2  
(22a)
∗ () ≡
(
∗3()
∗5()
if  ≤ ∗2
if ∗2  
(22b)
∗() ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∗1
∗−14 ()
∗−12 ()
if  ≥ ∗1(∗1)
if ∗1(∗1)   ≥ ∗3(∗2)
if ∗3(∗2)  
(22c)
where ∗1 ≡
√
5− 2, ∗2 ≡
√
33−5
2 , ∗1() ≡  45− , ∗2() ≡ 2(1+)3−4 , ∗3() ≡ 4(4+)26−2 , ∗4() ≡
2(1−)(4+)7+3 , and ∗5() ≡ 4(1+)7+3 and the superscript −1 denotes an inverse function. Then, the
following table contains the equilibrium strategies, execution probabilities and parameter conditions
for each type of equilibrium.
Equilibrium ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗| Condition  Condition 
1 (SLFR) ˆ−∗ ˆ−∗ 1−4 14  ≤ ∗()  ≥ ∗ ()
2 (ULFR) ˆ−∗ ˆ−∗ 14 14   ∗()  ≥ ∗ ()
3 ˆ+∗ ˆ−∗ 2−4 14  ≤ ∗() ∗ ()   ≥ ∗ ()
4 (SHFR) ˆ+∗ ˆ+∗ 2−4 12  ≤ ∗()   ∗ ()
5 (UHFR) ˆ+∗ ˆ+∗ 12 12   ∗()   ∗ ()
and the associated outside option values are given by
Equilibrium  ∗  ∗
1 (SLFR) (2) 1−5− (2) 8−(3+)(5−)(4+)
2 (ULFR) (2) 1+7+3 (2) 3−7+3
3 (2) 2−6−− 26− (2) 8−(2+)(6−)(4+)+ 4(1−)(6−)(4+)
4 (SHFR) (2) 2−6−− 26− (2) 4+(2−)(6−)(2+)+ 2−(8−)(6−)(2+)
5 (UHFR) (2) 13− 23(1+) (2)13+ 1−33(1+)
Finally, it is straightforward, albeit tedious to show that no other equilibria exist, which estab-
lishes uniqueness.
24
Proof of Proposition 2
On the equilibrium path, the transitions from one state to another follow a Markov chain with
transition matrix
 ∗ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− )(1− ∗| ) (1− )∗| (1− ∗| ) ∗|
1−  0  0
(1− ) 12 (1− ) 12 (1− ∗| ) ∗|
1−  0  0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(23)
As in Colliard and Foucault (2012), the stationary probability distribution ∗ = (∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ )
is then simply given by the left eigenvector of  ∗ associated with the unit modulus.
Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows immediately from the expected limit order profits computed in the proof of
Proposition 1, where  ∗0 = 13(2− ) for  ∈ Σ and  ∗0 = 25 for  ∈ Σ.
Proof of Corollary 2
The trading rates for each type of equilibrium are obtained by substituting the respective execu-
tion probabilities from the proof of Proposition 1 into the formula for the stationary probability
distribution derived in Proposition 2. We collect them in the following table.
Equilibrium ∗
SLFR 4+(1−)(4+)(5−)
ULFR 4+3(1−)20−+2
SHFR 4−(1−)12+−2
UHFR 13
Because ∗0 = 13 for  ∈ Σ and ∗0 = 15 for  ∈ Σ, the result follows immediately.
Proof of Corollary 3
The result follows directly from STs’ execution probabilities computed in the Proof of Proposition
1, where ∗0 = 12 for  ∈ Σ and ∗0 = 14 for  ∈ Σ.
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Proof of Corollary 4
From the computations involved in the Proof of Proposition 1 it follows that ∗|− = ∗|− = 12
for  ∈ Σ. It is then easy to deduce that the probability of being picked oﬀ for each type of
equilibrium is given by
Equilibrium ∗ ∗
SLFR 0 0
ULFR 0 0
SHFR 12−

2
UHFR 12

2
Because ∗0 = 12 for  ∈ Σ and ∗0 = 0 for  ∈ Σ, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 5
The ∗ are easily computed by multiplying the probability of observing a limit order by a type−
trader, ∗ , with the respective conditional execution probability. Then, some rather involved
computations reveal that
Equilibrium (∗ ) (∗ )
SLFR 3+5− 4+(7+)(5−)(4+)
ULFR 4+(55−(16−5))(7+3)(4+(3+))  1+57+3
SHFR 2+6−− 16−6(5−)(4+(1−))(6−) 8(1−)(2+)
2+4(5−)(4+2)
(2+)(6−)(8+4(3−)) − 2(5−)(8(1−)(2+)+(28−8))(2+)(6−)(8+4(3−)) 
UHFR 13− 4−63(1+) 13− 43(1+)
The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 6
The following table collects  ∗ and  ∗ for all equilibria.
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Equilibrium  ∗  ∗
SLFR 4−5+24+5−2
2−

ULFR 4−4+3+2
8−4
4−+2
SHFR 4−24+−2
20−4
8+12−42
UHFR 1 1
In order to show that  ∗ ( ∗ ) is increasing (decreasing) in , we require that an equilib-
rium transition due to an increase in  yields an increase (decrease) in the ratio. Under Assumption
1, increases in  given a fixed level of () may lead to the following transitions: UHFR→SHFR,
SHFR→SLFR, SHFR→ULFR, and UHFR→ULFR. It is easily verified that this is always the case
such that the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 7
Expanding equation (11) yields
∗ = 
∗
∗ + ∗
∙
1
2
| +  −∗ |+ 12 | −  −
∗ |
¸
(24)
+
∗
∗ + ∗
" 
2 | +  −∗ |+ 2 | −  −∗ |
+ (1−)2
¯¯ +  −+∗ ¯¯+ (1−)2 ¯¯ −  −−∗ ¯¯
#
Then, substituting the respective equilibrium quotes ∗ and (∗  +∗  −∗ ) leads to the
following expressions for the pricing error in the diﬀerent types of equilibria.
Equilibrium ∗ Condition on 
SLFR (3+)(4+)−2
2(5−)
(5−)(4+) + 4−(5−)(1−)4 
ULFR 4+35+362+213(7+3)(4−+2) + 4−5(1−)4−+2 
SHFR (5−)(1−)(2+)(6−)(4+(1−)) + 24−(18−(22−(9−)))(6−)(4+(1−))  for    2+10−2
(1−)(2+)(4+(5−))
(6−)(4+(1−)) − 16−(5−)(6+(4−))(6−)(4+(1−))  for  2+10−2 ≥    4+
2
26−2
16+(20+(4−(23−3)))
(2+)(6−)(4+(1−)) − 2(16−(22−(36−(11−))))(2+)(6−)(4+(1−))  for  4+
2
26−2 ≥ 
UHFR (1−)3 + 2(1−)+3(1+
3)
3(1+)  for   1+7+3
1
3− 4−6(1−)3(1+)  for 1+7+3 ≥ 
It is easy to show that we have ∗0 = 35 +  for  ∈ Σ, ∗0 =  for  ≥   15 and
∗0 = 13 − 23 for 15 ≥ . It follows that ∗  ∗0 for all  ∈ (0 1) and  ∈ Σ. Similarly,
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one may verify that we have ∗  ∗0 for all  ∈ (0 1) when  ∈ bΣ ≡ (ˆ ˇ), where ˆ = 2
and ˇ ' 017785. In order to see this, first focus on the case where   15. In this parameter
range, it is easy to see that ∗  ∗0 for all  ∈ (0 1) whenever   2. Now consider the case
where 15 ≥ . While tedious, it can be verified that for this parameter range we have ∗  ∗0
in any SHFR. Now consider the UFHR equilibrium and suppose that 5 ≥   1+7+3. In this
case, ∗  ∗0 implies that  . Recall from Proposition 1 that such an equilibrium can only
arise for ∗2()  . It follows that ˇ = ∗2(˜) where ˜ ' 017436 is the unique real positive solution
to ∗2() = (1+)(1−(1−))5+4−22+33 . Finally, for 1+7+3 ≥  we have ∗  ∗0 (∗  ∗0) in the
UHFR equilibrium for   13 (  13).
Proof of Corollary 8
Direct substitution into equation (12) yields the following.
Equilibrium  ∗  ∗
SLFR (2)1−5− (2) 8−(3+)(5−)(4+)
ULFR 28+(1+(12−))(7+3)(20−+2) (2) (2) 3−7+3
SHFR 2−6−(2)− 6(5−)(12+(1−))(6−) 48+(24−(10+(3−)))(2+)(6−)(12+(1−)) (2) + 60−(42+(24−6))(2+)(6−)(12+(1−))
UHFR (2)13 − 23(1+) (2) 13 + 2(1−)3(1+)
We have  ∗0 = 23 for  ∈ Σ and  ∗0 = 25 for  ∈ Σ, such that the result follows immediately.
Proof of Corollary 9
Follows from Corollary 8, equation (14) and the fact that ˆ ∗(1)  ˆ ∗(0).
28
Appendix B - Figures
Figure 1: Timing of events in the limit order market
This figure depicts the timing of events from the arrival of a trader at time t until the arrival of the next trader.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Map
This figure depicts the functions σ∗FT (α), σ
∗
ST (α) and α
∗
S(σ) defined in equations (22a) - (22c) in
the (α,σ)-space, where we have set L = 1. The shaded grey area indicates the interval [σ,σ).
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